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MARIA DEMERTZIS AND STAVROS A. ZENIOS
The euro-area sovereign debt crisis is receding. Europe is on a recovery path, 
growth is broad-based and unemployment is falling. One after the other, 
countries hit hardest by the crisis are exiting their adjustment programmes. 
However, debt remains high in most countries and future debt crises should 
not be ruled out. While the memories are fresh, it is a good time to think 
about insurance against future shocks. Such insurance schemes must 
involve risk sharing with the markets. They weaken the bank-sovereign 
doom loop from the sovereigns’ side, and not just from the banks’ side as 
pursued by the banking union, and make for a more resilient euro area.
The promotion of the banking union and the establishment of a European 
Monetary Fund are institution-based solutions to crises. Banking union 
provides the safety regulations that will make banking institutions more 
resilient, while the EMF is a ‘fire brigade’ to be called on in emergencies. 
What has not been tapped are the markets, whose tolerant behaviour to 
sovereign demands encouraged the built up of debt, while their finicky 
response exacerbated the crisis.  
Taking ongoing G20 discussions on sovereign contingent debt as the point 
of departure, we argue that these instruments could provide market-based 
insurance to protect the euro area from future debt crises. Risk-sharing 
with the markets is a constructive way forward in the context of the Franco-
German debate on risk-sharing among states versus system-wide risk 
reduction. The financial innovation of contingent debt is a practical euro-
area reform that would not introduce risk-sharing between states or require 
institutional reforms or Treaty changes. However, coordination would be 
needed. 
State contingent debt as 
insurance for euro-area 
sovereigns
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1 Introduction 
The G20 finance ministers and central bank governors who met in Chengdu, China, in 2016, revived the 
old idea of contingent debt for sovereigns, or debt with payment obligations that is contingent on the 
economic conditions of the sovereign. In their final communiqué, they asked the International 
Monetary Fund to “analyse the technicalities, opportunities, and challenges of state-contingent debt 
instruments”. After consultations with investors and sovereign debt managers, the IMF submitted a 
comprehensive report (IMF, 2017). IMF staff argued that state-contingent debt instruments are an 
appealing countercyclical tool for risk-sharing with the markets, and suggested that careful instrument 
design, robust institutions, contracts and regulations could address the barriers to market 
development. 
The debate on their relative merits is ongoing and additional work is currently under way, including analytical 
work to understand their merits and potential shortcomings, and legal work to develop formal term sheets1. 
Benford et al (2018) provide an edited volume on the state-of-the-art on GDP-linked bonds. 
We contribute a novel angle to the study of these instruments:  
Sovereign contingent debt can provide insurance against future sovereign debt crises in the euro 
area. 
We discuss the insurance potential of GDP-linked bonds, and generalise to another class of instruments, 
namely sovereign CoCos (S-CoCos) which are debt instruments with a potential payment standstill and 
maturity extension mechanism built-in. We highlight in particular the potential they might offer the euro area. 
The insurance perspective goes to the core of the Franco-German debate about risk sharing. Germany 
argues for system-wide risk reduction and France argues for risk sharing among euro-area states. In 
insurance parlance, Germany argues for actuarial fairness and France for sustainable insurance 
mechanisms. Demertzis (2018) and Bénassy-Quéré et al (2018) have argued that this is a false 
dichotomy, since both are needed for an insurance market to function. Well-designed insurance 
systems need to deal with both moral hazard and adverse selection. In the reported words of Benoît 
Cœuré at an IMF event on 18 January 2018, “There is a lot of discussion about risk-reduction. But 
diversification and integration are part of risk-reduction”. We contribute to this debate with a 
discussion of the use of sovereign contingent debt that introduces risk-sharing with the markets, thus 
bringing more market discipline and reducing overall risks.  
There are many arguments in favour of the insurance potential of these instruments. The main one, in our 
opinion, is that contingent debt makes the no bail-out rule more credible by weakening the bank-sovereign 
doom loop. Systemic benefits for the euro area create incentives for coordination, and existing institutional 
arrangements could overcome the coordination problem, removing first-mover disadvantages.  
                                                      
1 For instance, IMF executive directors deliberated on the staff report and concluded that these novel instruments, “in principle, 
[have] the potential to broaden the sovereign toolkit for debt management, reduce the probability of sovereign debt crises, 
make financial systems more resilient, diversify opportunities for investors and debt managers, and strengthen the 
international financial system”. Nevertheless, many directors were skeptical of the potential for broader use of these 
instruments in the face of “practical complications and risks […], including high initial liquidity and novelty premia 
demanded by investors, adverse selection, moral hazard, weaker incentives for sound fiscal management, and adverse 
consequences for conventional debt instruments”. Allen & Overy, at the prompting of Bank of England, took the initiative to design 
the ‘London Term Sheet for GDP-linked bonds’, providing a template for discussion and analysis. Staff from Bank of Canada and Allen 
& Overy are currently taking a similar initiative on extendible bonds. 
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In the rest of this section we discuss the bank-sovereign doom loop, before reviewing sovereign 
contingent debt in section 0. Section 3 discusses the insurance function of sovereign contingent 
instruments and how they weaken the doom loop. Section 4 uses simple simulations to illustrate the 
maximum fiscal space that could have been created during the period 2002-17 from contingent debt, 
and the insurance protection during the troughs in 2008 and 2011. Section 5 discusses the 
challenges of introducing these instruments and the catalytic role of the European Stability 
Mechanism. Indeed, one of the contingent debt instruments we discuss could be used to 
operationalise modifications to the ESM treaty already suggested by the German Ministry of Finance 
(and others). Section 6 concludes. 
1.1 The sovereign-bank doom loop challenge 
Article 125 of the Maastricht Treaty, the so called no bail-out clause, ensures that countries remain 
fully responsible for repaying public debt. In the event of loss of market access, the country will default 
and re-negotiate with creditors bilaterally on restructuring its debt.  
The Greek crisis has shown that the no bail-out clause was not credible. Banks in euro-area countries 
owned considerable Greek debt, creating a bank-sovereign doom loop whereby a sovereign default 
would have jeopardised the viability of the banks. Member states found it important for the stability of 
their own financial systems to interfere and ‘rescue’ Greece by effectively buying most of its non-
tradeable debt. 
This has shown that steps were needed to reduce the risks of the doom loop. Banking union, and the 
bail-in institutionalised in the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (2014/59/EU), reduced the 
likelihood that weak banks would jeopardise a sovereign’s finances, but did not eliminate the 
possibility of a bail-out. 
Three conditions would have to be fulfilled to make the no-bail-out clause credible (Pisani-Ferry, 
2016): 
1. Define insolvency procedures, for example in the context of ESM (future EMF) programmes, for 
extreme and rare situations. This is equivalent to allowing for an ‘orderly’ default in an attempt 
to avoid a financial crisis. 
2. Provide a fiscal backstop for rare yet very distorting default events, since countries that 
default require support to get their economies back on track. 
3. Reduce the exposure of banks to sovereign debt risk. This would weaken the doom loop from 
the direction of the sovereign, by contrast to the banking union which addresses the loop from 
the banks’ direction. 
We discuss the third of these conditions. One suggestion, by Véron (2017), was that there should be 
‘curbs’ on the exposure of a bank’s balance sheet to each sovereign; here we discuss an option for that 
building on contingent debt. Unlike curbs on banks’ exposure to sovereign debt, contingent debt can 
be viewed as a form of insurance that would be triggered in the case of certain adverse events. Banks 
(and others) that hold sovereign contingent debt would receive payments linked to the sovereign’s 
outlook: in good times they would receive more and in bad times they would receive less. This would 
reduce banks’ dependence on sovereigns ex ante, since the likelihood of sovereign default would be 
reduced. Furthermore, the premium received by banks that these instruments would provide 
additional regulatory capital.   
There are two ways to improve the resilience of a system to unavoidable shocks: either support 
provided by the healthy to the weak (ie transfers) or universal insurance. This is not to say that steps 
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should not be taken to impose fiscal discipline and to regulate banks to ensure that every component 
of the system remains healthy. Risk reduction benefits each and all. However, no system is fool-proof, 
and when the unavoidable shock hits one or more of its components there is a need to restore system-
wide stability. To do so requires either transfers in the form of bail-outs, or universal insurance. We 
explain how the later could work using sovereign contingent debt in a way that is actuarially fair, with 
each member paying premiums commensurate to its own risks. However, for the insurance markets to 
kick-start there is a need for all parts of the system to participate, not only the riskier parts. The 
sustainability principle therefore applies, since it is the stronger economies that must take the lead to 
offer their own contingent debt first. (We will see later how Canada played such a role, successfully 
and without increasing its financing costs). 
 
2 Debt or equity financing for sovereigns 
We examine the two main types of sovereign contingent debt discussed in the IMF report: GDP-linked 
bonds, and extendible sovereign CoCo (sovereign contingent convertible debt).   
• GDP-linked bonds have returns indexed to the real growth rate of GDP. There are two variants 
of indexation, coupon-indexed or floaters Borensztein and Mauro, 2004) and principal-
indexed or linkers (Kamstra and Schiller, 2009; see also Benford et al, 2018). 
• Sovereign CoCos, or extendibles, convert into a bond of extended maturity and, potentially, a 
standstill of coupon payments, when a trigger breaches a threshold. The event triggering the 
conversion reflects difficulties faced by a sovereign in meeting its debt servicing obligations 
(Brooke et al, 2013; Consiglio and Zenios, 2015). See also IMF (2017). 
Both instruments are contingent contracts in legal speak. As such, they allow for risk sharing between 
the contracting parties, and the ‘neglected risk’ of sovereign default is no longer neglected2. The former 
are continuous instruments providing ‘health insurance’ against economic cycle volatility. However, 
they are not fiscal instruments per se, and are not used to stabilise the cycle in lieu of government 
intervention. Instead they create fiscal space for the government to act during the deep troughs of the 
cycle. The latter are discrete instruments and provide ‘accident insurance’ against extreme 
catastrophic events.  
There are of course many practical issues to be specified for well-defined contracts, and, as shown by 
Consiglio and Zenios (2018), the design specifications make a difference to the risk premium and 
determine whether an instrument is beneficial for a sovereign or not. Box 1 gives details on both GDP-
linked bonds and sovereign CoCos, and we highlight an overarching distinction between the two.  
1. GDP-linked bonds are equity-like instruments. They are comparable to (non-voting) shares in a 
corporation, with dividends paid as a share of national income rather than of corporate profits. 
Floaters are puttable shares since coupon payment has a floor. 
2. Sovereign CoCo are debt instruments with limited downside risk. 
GDP-linked bonds inherit the economic cycle volatility without capital guarantee. They appeal to long-
term investors, such as pension funds or university endowments, that wish to diversify their risks and 
share in “the wealth of the nation”  (Kamstra and Shiller, 2009). For pension fund participants, the 
linkers provide protection for standards of living since the payments received are a constant fraction of 
GDP. Official sector lenders are potential buyers, since they already provide substantial support to 
                                                      
2 The notion of neglected risk as a root cause of financial fragility was introduced by Gennaioli et al (2012). 
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sovereigns and they have long horizons that allow them to absorb volatile returns. In the current low 
interest rate environment, these instruments could provide relatively high yields, while they shield 
investors from counterparty risk. IMF (2017) also point out that these instruments would be attractive 
in Islamic financing, since linkers are compliant with Sharia law, which bars fixed interest. 
Sovereign CoCos have limited downside risk with capital guarantees. Liquidity rich investors can 
weather a maturity extension and/or a standstill, and benefit from higher yields. There is also a 
potential market for (re)insurers of tail risk, since they provide a natural hedge against tail risk, if the 
risk factors in the sovereign CoCo and the tail risks of the (re-)insurer are correlated. 
The main argument of the proponents of contingent debt is that they create countercyclical fiscal 
space acting as automatic stabilisers. Sovereign CoCos provide stabilisation only during a crisis, in a 
discrete intervention, whereas GDP-linked bonds provide continuous smoothing. Creating fiscal space 
is particularly relevant during a crisis when a country might need a combination of concessional 
financing and austerity to create primary surplus and reduce public debt. This leaves limited room for 
countercyclical fiscal support, but contingent debt lowers primary surplus needs and creates space. 
Fiscal space also relaxes the time constraints for privatisation plans, avoiding fire sales of state 
assets. We add to the main argument some complimentary viewpoints showing how these 
instruments act as insurance3. 
  
                                                      
3 Brooke et al (2013); IMF (2017); Consiglio and Zenios (2015). 
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Box 1. GDP-linked bonds and sovereign CoCos  
Coupon-indexed GDP-linked bonds, or floaters (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004) 
These bonds link the coupon 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  to GDP growth using the formula 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = max  [ 𝑐𝑐0 + (  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡  - ?̅?𝑔 ), 0]                                             (1) 
where 𝑐𝑐0 is the base coupon rate that is adjusted by the deviations of the real growth rate 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡  from its 
target value ?̅?𝑔. If growth exceeds the target, the coupon increases from the baseline, otherwise coupon 
payments decrease with a floor at zero. 
Principal-indexed GDP-linked bonds, or linkers (Kamstra and Shiller, 2009) 
These bonds pay principal at maturity according to the formula 
𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵0 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌0                                                                      (2) 
where 𝐵𝐵0 is the original amount issued, typically 100, and 𝑌𝑌𝑜𝑜,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  are the nominal GDP values at the 
issuing date and at t, respectively. 
Sovereign CoCo (S-CoCo), or extendibles (Brooke et al, 2013; Consiglio and Zenios, 2015) 
These bonds allow payment standstill when some indicator(s) breaches a threshold. During the 
standstill period coupons might or might not be paid, but principal payments are delayed. A three-year 
standstill is broadly aligned with the duration of official assistance programmes. 
Suggested triggers: 
• 30-day average of CDS spread (Consiglio and Zenios, 2015) 
• 100-day average of the excess interest rate above German bunds (Mody, 2014) 
• Signing an assistance programme with the official sector such as the IMF or ESM (Andritzky et 
al, 2016) 
Threshold: For the market driven triggers above, the threshold is set to correspond to a probability of 
default about 5 percent. 
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2.1 Understanding how they help 
Reducing liquidity and insolvency risk 
The two instruments provide insurance against different adverse events. Sovereign CoCos provide 
short-term relief that is effective only if the sovereign faces a liquidity crisis. GDP-linked bonds, 
especially the linkers, offer protection from insolvency as debt service payments are adjusted with 
GDP (Brooke et al, 2013; Consiglio and Zenios, 2015). 
Reducing the probability of default 
Floaters reduce debt service costs, putting downward pressure on debt levels and providing protection 
against potential default arising from external shocks. Linkers reduce debt directly, since the nominal 
value is linked to growth. With sovereign CoCos, the payment standstill provides time and fiscal space 
so that a liquidity crisis does not morph into an insolvency situation, thereby also reducing the 
likelihood of default. We will see later that there is ample fiscal space in euro-area countries to be 
created from the use of either instrument, so that default insurance can be effective. 
Diversification of the funding base 
Both instruments appeal to a broader investor base with a higher risk appetite than investors currently 
holding risk-free low-yield government bonds. Diversifying the investor base is attractive for two 
reasons. First, in normal times the sovereign can draw financing from a broader set of investors. 
Second, during stress episodes the risks are spread more broadly. This is the same argument used for 
CAT (‘catastrophe’) bonds. In the case of sovereign contingent debt, it has the added advantage of 
making the system more resilient. When an insurance company taps the market via CAT bonds, it 
protects its shareholders from catastrophic events. When a sovereign taps a broader market base for 
its debt, it protects not only itself but also its creditors, by having more shoulders to carry the burden 
of a default. 
Risk sharing between creditors and debtors 
The cost of potential default is (partially) shifted from the international institutions that deal with 
sovereign bail-outs to the sovereigns’ creditors. Either way, the debtor shares the cost of default 
through balance sheet consolidation, with adverse welfare affects. However, the burden on the official 
sector is lighter, since the size of an assistance programme is reduced. Creditors cannot count on 
international taxpayers to carry all costs. 
Risk sharing removes creditor moral hazard. Creditors have a propensity to buy short-term debt from 
crisis countries on the assumption that, in the short run, a crisis country is likely to be bailed out, but 
the long-term prospects are unclear. In the short-run, the country is treated as having a liquidity 
problem to be solved with official sector assistance, but in the long-run the country might be facing an 
insolvency problem that could require private-sector involvement. With sovereign contingent 
instruments, short-term creditors will receive reduced coupon payments or face a standstill in the 
same way that long-term creditors might witness a default. Hence, flight to short-term debt – with its 
adverse effect on long-term yields – is arrested. 
Transparent risk pricing 
Sovereign debt is considered risk free and carries zero weight in the regulatory capital requirements of 
Basel III. However, as the Greek debt restructuring reminded us, sovereign debt is not risk free. Prior to 
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the 2010 Deauville agreement between President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel, euro-area sovereign 
default risk was neglected. When risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive ex ante, and 
when investors eventually recognise the risks, they precipitate a flight to quality and markets become 
fragile ex post (Gennaiolo et al, 2012). In state-contingent debt, those risks are explicitly priced. 
Hence, sovereign default risk is no longer neglected, and excessive debt issuance is moderated. This 
reduces fragility.   
Speedy response to crises 
One of the arguments in favour of contingent debt for banks was that supervisory discretion would be 
replaced by rules, thus avoiding problems of regulatory forbearance that play a significant role in 
banking crises. The equivalent malaise in sovereign crises is the “pathological procrastination” 
exhibited by the sovereigns in trouble and the international organisations that come to the rescue 
(Buchheit, 2011). Sovereign CoCos force creditors and debtors to act as soon an objective threshold is 
breached. 
 
3 Insurance for sovereigns in the euro area 
Sovereigns do not buy insurance, and a search for ‘insurance for sovereigns’ produced zero hits on 
Google Trends. Sovereigns use the resources of the state to address whatever calamity befalls their 
citizens. But now and then the state falters, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show using eight centuries 
of data, and international assistance comes to the rescue. International assistance is forthcoming 
when it comes to exogenous disasters, such as hurricanes or earthquakes. But when the disaster is a 
financial crisis, no matter what precipitated it, the sovereign is left to its own devices. International 
assistance is deliberate, comes with strict conditions and is expensive. It should be like this, to avoid 
moral hazard and discourage profligacy. 
Sovereign contingent debt can provide insurance during the deep troughs of the economic cycle and 
the rare, but not unexpected, banking crises. These events have significant economic and social costs, 
and the sovereign’s resources might not be sufficient to pull itself out of trouble. That’s when 
contingent debt insurance kicks in.  
Insurance theory tells us that diversifiable risks should be diversified away. Non-diversifiable risks 
should be shared. A sovereign might diversify its economy but cannot diversify away its GDP risk, so 
the risk of sharp GDP drops must be shared. The banking sector can diversify both assets and 
liabilities, but there is a strong evidence for home bias on the asset side, and liability diversification is 
limited since banks cater to local depositor bases. Luxembourg, Malta and Singapore are rare 
exceptions, and so was Cyprus until it was hit by the ‘perfect crisis’ (Zenios, 2013). Asset 
diversification is promoted by Basel III, although the zero risk weight on sovereign assets and the 
political economy of scarce credit (Calomiris and Haber, 2014) encourage home bias. Véron’s curbs 
diversify banks’ assets among multiple sovereigns. While this is a good idea, it exposes – indirectly, 
through bank guarantees and the doom loop – each sovereign to other sovereigns. In the euro area, all 
banks will hold diversified but highly correlated (if not identical) portfolios. This increases systemic 
risk that must be shared. Risk sharing appears unavoidable. 
We reiterate that sovereign contingent debt goes beyond the controversial risk-sharing between 
member states and adds the concept of risk-sharing with the markets. There is still a need to 
coordinate and eliminate the first-mover disadvantage and kick-start a liquid market. However, each 
sovereign pays a premium commensurate with its own risks, thus avoiding moral hazard and indirect 
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fiscal transfers. The payment of the risk premium comes from each sovereign during the good days. 
Averaged over the long run we expect this to be near to, but higher than, zero, much in the same way 
most of us pay, during our lifetime, more in insurance premiums than the insurance payments we 
receive. Insurance premiums are paid by everybody, who may receive no paybacks, while a few may 
receive large payments for health-related expenses. 
Having resolved the moral hazard problem, we anticipate that collective action will be possible since 
there are positive systemic effects from reduced individual vulnerabilities. At the country level, the 
banking union, if effective, will help reduce banks’ exposures to their own sovereigns. At the aggregate 
level, and given the degree of interdependence, it is important to approach Europe as more than just 
the sum of its parts and any attempt to further integrate should be driven by a desire to strengthen the 
system. Strengthening systems, in turn, requires both reforming their parts (risk reduction) and the 
putting in place of mechanisms to hold these parts together as a system (risk-sharing between 
countries and with the markets). This is not unlike a national health policy: we promote healthier 
lifestyles to strengthen each part of the system (the individual), but we also enforce collective 
insurance so that the healthcare system as a whole survives. The collective nature of agreements, 
effectively forcing the healthy to also subscribe, helps resolve this and recognises that the current 
healthy may also be its future consumers. This resolves the problem of adverse selection. 
Is there sufficient depth in the markets to provide the required insurance? The global capital markets 
stood at €175 trillion in 2010, with equity and private debt securities at €96 trillion, and €79 trillion in 
bank deposits and government debt. By comparison EU28 sovereign debt stood at €10 trillion. The 
equity and private debt markets are sufficiently deep to provide insurance to sovereigns, for a 
premium of course. The asset base of buy-side entities is expected to reach around €80 trillion by 
20204, so tapping 8 percent of these assets through contingent debt could insure half of the sovereign 
debt.  
It would not be the first time that capital markets are tapped to provide insurance. CAT bonds have 
been used to provide market-based risk transfer solutions for catastrophic events, such as hurricanes 
and earthquakes. These instruments have been gaining popularity since Hurricane Andrew in 1992 
and the introduction of insurance futures and options by the Chicago Board of Trade. 
 
3.1 Weakening the sovereign-bank doom loop 
We have argued that in the absence of a fully credible no-bail out clause, the only other thing to do is to 
attempt to avoid the need for a bailout, and to reduce its size if it cannot be avoided. This is achieved 
by weakening the sovereign-bank doom loop. Banking union does that by putting a number of earlier 
corrective steps in place (bail-in) to cushion shocks and absorb losses in order to reduce the need for 
a bail out. Banks’ fragility therefore becomes less of a danger to sovereigns. 
State contingent debt attempts to do the same thing, by reducing the speed at which sovereign 
fragilities jeopardise banks’ health. First, for a given risk profile, banks will not replace standard bonds 
with GDP linked alternatives because they carry a higher premium. In this respect, they would need to 
hold less of the latter in order to maintain an equivalent risk profile. This in turn would reduce both the 
home bias and excessive lending. Second, the stabilisation properties of such forms of debt reduce 
                                                      
4 See Global Capital Markets 2016, Boston Consulting Group, available at   
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2016/financial-institutions-technology-digital-value-migration-global-capital-markets-
2016.aspx, accessed April 2018. 
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the probability of default and help countries escape problems easier, especially when they are not 
extreme. Third, if contingent debt is pursued by all – the only way that it can remain sustainable – then 
systemic risk is reduced. No single country can easily jeopardise the health of a system because risks 
are shared with the markets, which become the first line of defence when a country gets into trouble. 
Banks in turn will have provisioned for such outcomes by collecting appropriate premiums ex ante. 
All of this rests on the assumptions that markets for such instruments develop, and that financial 
markets price in these risks in ways that are interesting for the banks’ balance sheets in terms of both 
return and safety. In section 5 we discuss some of the challenges that arise and how to overcome 
them. 
 
4 Fiscal space to insure against deep troughs in economic cycles 
We ran simple simulations for EU countries over the period 2002-17 to estimate the fiscal space 
margins from contingent debt. We assumed that all marketable securities are floaters or S-CoCos and 
proceeded as follows. First, we calculated current interest service payments as a fraction of GDP and 
estimated the effective interest rate on the sovereign’s debt. Second, we adjusted this interest rate 
according to the contingent provision. Third, we compared the current debt service payments with 
payments under the adjusted rates to estimate the fiscal space. This is positive during recessions, and 
negative during above-average growth5. We also consider the effects of a fiscal stimulus equal in 
magnitude to the savings from the contingent debt, with an appropriate fiscal multiplier. Our simulation 
is in a partial-equilibrium setting, to illustrate the maximum fiscal space that could become available 
from the use of contingent debt. More work is needed with a general equilibrium model to get a fine-
tuned assessment of the benefits. Nevertheless, our simulations show that (1) there are significant 
insurance potential benefits; (2) all countries would benefit from GDP-linked bonds and several from 
sovereign CoCos, in difficult circumstances; and (3) the overall net contribution during the 15-year 
period does not seem prohibitively large as the price to pay for insurance. Naturally, some counties 
would benefit more than others. 
 
4.1 Fiscal space from GDP-linked bonds 
For GDP-linked bonds we consider floaters (eqn. 1) paying the effective interest rate when growth rates 
equal the European Commission’s GDP growth projections (AMECO data) for 2002-16. We first assume 
that the sovereign converts all its debt into contingent at zero premium, and there are no fiscal 
multipliers. With these simplifying assumptions we obtain the maximum possible space created by 
GDP-linked during recessions. The fiscal space created during the euro-area double dip crisis in 2008 
and 2011, for a few select countries, is shown in Table 1 (top panel). This fiscal space can be used to 
provide stimulus and spur growth, and using fiscal multiplier 0.6 during growth periods and 0.9 in 
recessions we obtain more accurate estimates of fiscal space in Table 1 (bottom panel). 
 
                                                      
5 The differences of debt service payments with GDP-linked bonds for all countries are reported in Table 5 (see the Annex), 
and with sovereign CoCos in Table 3 for those countries that would have seen the payment standstill triggered during a 
crisis.  
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Table 1: Fiscal space created during the trough of the euro-area crisis with GDP-linked bonds 
Country Period 2008S2-2010S1 Period 2011S2-2013S2 
Without fiscal multipliers 
Euro area 1.40 % of GDP 1.01% of GDP 
Germany 0.92% of GDP 0.12% of GDP 
Greece 3.27% of GDP 2.33% of GDP 
Italy 2.31% of GDP 2.19% of GDP 
With fiscal multipliers of 0.6 during growth periods and 0.9 in recessions 
Euro area 1.09 % of GDP 0.70% of GDP 
Germany 0.81% of GDP 0.15% of GDP 
Greece 2.13% of GDP 2.23% of GDP 
Italy 1.44% of GDP 1.25% of GDP 
We note from Table 1 that all countries benefit from these instruments during recessions. The highest 
benefits accrue to Greece, but even Germany would benefit by almost 1 percent of GDP during the 
crisis of 2008. When we apply fiscal multipliers, the fiscal space is reduced. This is understandable, 
and desirable, since economic conditions improve from the stimulus. Using the insurance analogy, 
countries receive less healthcare because their economies heal faster. 
Figure 1 illustrates GDP growth with and without the stimulus provided from GDP-linked bonds. Again, 
we consider GDP-linked bonds issued with a zero premium, assuming that the premium for GDP 
volatility is compensated for from the reduced default risk. Clearly Greece gets significant protection 
during the downside and so does Italy, but the changes are slight for the euro area as a whole, while 
Germany has imperceptible changes. 
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Figure 1: GDP with and without GDP-linked bonds issued with zero premium 
(With fiscal multiplier 0.6 during growth periods and 0.9 in recessions) 
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Table 2: Net contribution from the use of GDP-linked bonds averaged over 2002—2017,  
as a percentage of GDP 
Country Premium 
100bp 50bp 0bp 
Euro area 0.41% of GDP 0.19% of GDP -0.04% of GDP 
Germany 0.41% of GDP 0.22% of GDP 0.03% of GDP 
Greece 0.25% of GDP 0.03% of GDP -0.19% of GDP 
Italy 0.62% of GDP 0.29% of GDP -0.03% of GDP 
 
In reality, the countries would pay a premium ex ante to issue linked debt, and ex post they pay a 
higher percentage of their GDP during times of above-average growth. These are the insurance 
premiums that markets demand to assume the GDP volatility risk and provide protection during a 
downturn. Table 2 shows the total net payments during the testing period for different premiums. With 
increasing premiums the net benefits erode, and this is illustrated further in Figure 2 where we repeat 
the GDP growth simulations with a premium of 50bp. 
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Figure 2: GDP with and without GDP-linked bonds issued with 50bp premium 
(With fiscal multiplier 0.6 during growth periods and 0.9 in recessions) 
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4.2 Fiscal space from sovereign CoCos 
We now look at the fiscal space created by sovereign CoCos with a payment standstill, assuming that 
all sovereign debt was of this type. We set a threshold at 600bp, and after a three year standstill all 
missed payments are made (with interest) over 10 semesters. During the testing period six countries 
would benefit from a standstill activated at some point during the crisis. Table 3 shows the average 
annualised fiscal space and its timing. 
Table 3: Fiscal space created during the euro-area crisis with sovereign CoCos 
Country Standstill triggered Fiscal space 
Bulgaria 2009S1 0.4% of GDP 
Ireland 2011S1 2.6% of GDP 
Greece 2010S1 4.1% of GDP 
Cyprus 2011S2 1.6% of GDP 
Portugal 2011S1 2.5% of GDP 
Romania 2008S2 0.7% of GDP 
 
Assuming fiscal multipliers of 0.6 and 0.9 for growth and recession periods, we look at the net 
difference between the average GDP growth of the countries with and without the sovereign CoCos 
during 202-2017, for different risk premiums (Table 4). As the premium for issuing CoCos increases, 
the net benefits erode and might even become net losses. However, the premium depends on the 
probability of breaching a threshold, and not on GDP volatility as in the case of GDP-linked bonds. We 
will see in the next section that countries can potentially issue sovereign CoCos with zero premiums. 
Naturally, countries like Greece would have to pay a high premium, given its high CDS spreads before 
the crisis. However, if Greece had issued CoCos in 2002 the spreads would have been much smaller.   
Table 4: Average net growth with and without sovereign CoCos during 2002-17 
Country Premium 
100bp 50bp 0bp 
Bulgaria -0.07% of GDP -0.03% of GDP 0.02% of GDP 
Ireland 0.08% of GDP 0.18% of GDP 0.28% of GDP 
Greece -0.06% of GDP 0.18% of GDP 0.41% of GDP 
Cyprus 0.00% of GDP 0.11% of GDP 0.21% of GDP 
Portugal -0.01% of GDP 0.18% of GDP 0.34% of GDP 
Romania 0.05% of GDP -0.01% of GDP 0.02% of GDP 
 
Are these premiums excessively high to pay for insurance to weaken the doom loop? This is hard to 
answer without quantifying the costs, financial and other, of the doom loop and recessions. 
4.3 What about Germany?   
A pressing question arises from the fact that the strong economies, such as Germany, do not obtain a 
net benefit from issuing more expensive debt, as shown in Figure 2. Even if a consensus is reached 
that insurance is essential, and that further weakening of the doom loop is desirable, and the 
premiums to be paid are reasonable, there remains an important coordination question: how to kick-
start the insurance market for sovereigns? Clearly, a distress period is not the right time to do it. It is 
better to redesign the system in good times, but also to not wait too long for the memories of the crisis 
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to fade. But why should the robust economies of the EU agree to issue GDP-linked bonds and pay the 
premium? The question remains even if the premium is calculated to reflect each country’s own risk, 
satisfying the principle of actuarial fairness without cross-country subsidies. The robust economies 
could argue that they would rather benefit from the good times in full and use their own resources to 
handle a downturn when it arises.  
There are two reasons why we believe it is in everyone’s interest to buy into such schemes.  
1. System-wide benefits from weakening the bank-sovereign doom loop. As risky countries 
benefit from shallower troughs (having paid for them in boom years), the probability of default 
decreases. This implies that debt crises, such as the one we have seen in the euro area, will 
become rarer. The system, ie the euro area, is better protected by strengthening the weaker 
links. This is better for the weaker links, it is better for the system, and by implication, it is 
better for the stronger economies, which are also part of the system. Given the 
interdependence of euro-area member states and spillover effects, this is, in our opinion, 
the predominant reason.   
2. Risk aversion, that makes us all buy insurance. Even the most robust economies suffer 
recessions, and our simulations show that Germany, for instance, would have also benefited 
from reduced interest payments during the crisis (Figure 3). 
It is worth noting that no country is paying anyone else’s premiums. Each pays a premium 
commensurate with its own risk. However, all countries must pay to kick-start an insurance market of 
liquid instruments, and create a diversified pool of instruments without a stigma that will be 
(eventually) well understood. This was the same rationale for pushing for international reforms to 
adopt Collective Action Clauses (CACs). Canada, a country that needed CACs the least, was the first 
developed economy to announce in 2000 the adoption of CACs, “providing leadership to the 
international community with respect to the development of an orderly framework for debt 
restructuring by debtors and creditors”6. 
Figure 3: Germany debt service payments as proportion of GDP are reduced significantly during the 
crisis when growth dropped to -4%, with the use of GDP-linked bonds 
 
                                                      
6 CACs for euro-area countries were reformed circa 2014 by the International Capital Markets Association (Gelpern et al, 
2016). 
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5 Challenges 
There are several challenges on the road to making contingent debt part of the financing toolbox of 
sovereigns. The potential benefits justify discussions to understand these instruments and find ways 
to overcome the challenges. 
A challenging question is estimating the risk premiums. We address this issue below.  
Τhe regulatory treatment of these instruments on bank balance sheets will determine how a major 
sovereign creditor class, ie banks, will respond to these instruments. Sovereign CoCos should have the 
same capital requirement risk weights as standard sovereign bonds, since capital is guaranteed. It is 
not obvious that the same treatment should be afforded to GDP-linked bonds. Certainly, GDP-linkers 
cannot be considered risk free since even the capital is not guaranteed. Floaters classified as ‘held to 
maturity’ can be treated like nominal sovereign bonds. However, if classified as ‘available for sale’ they 
must be marked-to-market with higher volatility than nominal bonds. 
The use of a market-based trigger needs further discussion. Market triggers contribute to transparency 
and speedy reaction to crises, the merits of specific triggers can easily be discerned, and we will see 
below that the ESM could play an important role in launching them. However, there are concerns about 
delegating to the markets such important decisions as a maturity extension or payment standstill. This 
concern has merit, but in any event sovereigns seek official sector assistance when they are cut out of 
the markets.  
Furthermore, though we argued that these instruments could serve to stabilise economic cycles, there 
are also concerns that they could be destabilising under some conditions. For instance, as the 
threshold is approached for a sovereign CoCo, a flight to safety could be triggered. While the payment 
standstill stabilises the cycle, the flight can be destabilising and could even be provoked by ‘bear 
raiders’. 
Finally, we reiterate the need for coordination to overcome first-mover disadvantages. Unless there is 
some coordination, no sovereign will be eager to pay by itself the premium today for the future 
benefits. Also, first movers will be charged innovation and liquidity premiums, unless there is 
sufficient volume. Institutions like the European Monetary Fund could be the first mover. 
5.1 Computing the risk premium 
The price of contingent debt has an impact on the fiscal space created and on the net effect on growth, 
so we turn to an estimation of the premium. Actually, there are several premiums: 
1. Innovation premium, for issuing novel instruments not understood by the market. 
2. Liquidity premium, for trading in illiquid markets in the early launching stages. 
3. Volatility premium, due to the volatility of GDP growth or CDS spreads. 
The first two premiums are transient (and there is a first-mover disadvantage), but can be reduced 
through coordination. However, the long-term suitability of these instruments hinges on the volatility 
premium, and the following question arises: 
Are the premiums so large that they erode any benefits for the sovereign? 
The total benefits net premium payments, will be, on average, negative.. Sovereigns will be paying the 
premium for the benefit of avoidance of the costs of a crisis, knowing that crises are an equal 
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opportunity malaise (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  Risk aversion dictates a willingness to pay a 
premium to avoid the catastrophic consequences of a crisis, even as we expect that a crisis will not 
happen to our country. So, given the protection a sovereign receives from contingent debt, we ask if 
the price is worth it. We turn this question on its head and ask instead: 
Can we design contingent debt for a fair price that is acceptable to sovereigns? 
The insurance products should be tailored to the needs of each sovereign and should be priced fairly 
to avoid moral hazard. These are important issues that deserve analytical work to produce realistic 
estimates and inform the debate. We illustrate the risk premiums for both GDP-linkers and sovereign 
CoCos in Box 27. 
For GDP-linkers we observe that for a broad range of design parameters, the buyers expect to be 
compensated for assuming GDP volatility risk. However, there are designs with low risk premium which 
can be acceptable to the sovereigns. Naturally, the less expensive designs provide less protection. For 
instance, for very low target growth rates, the country will rarely benefit from reduced coupon 
payments and the markets will not demand a premium (the premium could even be negative with the 
country issuing ex ante cheaper debt but paying ex post higher rates). Naturally, the measurement of 
GDP and delayed revisions of these statistics by the national agencies can be a stumbling block for 
introducing GDP-linked bonds. In particular the audit of GDP cannot be under the control of the 
government making GDP-linked payments. In the EU the presence of independent agencies that report 
reliable statistics – Eurostat and the ECB – alleviates these concerns. 
For sovereign CoCos the par yield is, in general, higher than the risk-free rate. Since the CDS process 
was calibrated for a period that included the euro-area crisis, Greece has a higher rate than Italy, which 
has higher rate than Germany. The rate is higher for lower thresholds that are more likely to be 
breached. Note that for Germany the sovereign CoCo par yield is identical to the risk-free rate, since the 
probability of German CDS breaching the threshold is virtually zero. 
These results provide evidence that there are designs with sufficiently low premiums to make 
contingent debt attractive for sovereigns. For sovereign CoCos the premium could be zero ex ante for 
safe countries, which this is encouraging for the prospect of countries adopting it. GDP-linked bonds, 
as equity-like instruments, carry a GDP volatility premium that no country can avoid. 
  
                                                      
7 Drawing on results from Consiglio and Zenios (2018) and Consiglio et al, 2016). 
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Box 2: Pricing and the risk premium for GDP-linked bonds and Sovereign CoCos 
 
Risk premium estimation for UK and the USA 
(Consiglio and Zenios, 2018) 
(The authors use negative premium for bonds sold at a discount, which are then more expensive for sovereigns. For 
positive premium the bonds are sold above par and the sovereign benefits in today’s price in expectation of higher future 
payments.) 
 
UK 
 
 
USA 
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Par pricing of euro-area sovereign CoCo for different trigger thresholds 
(Consiglio, 2016) 
(Horizontal line is the calibration risk free rate for the German bund.) 
 
 
 
5.2 First mover and a role for European Monetary Fund 
Currently, the ESM provides funding to euro-area countries when they lose market access. It raises 
capital from the markets, borrowing at lower rates since it is capitalised by all euro-area countries, and 
lends to a programme country at a small spread to cover its costs. The principle of solidarity applies, 
but not of actuarial fairness. The programme country pays lower rates than if it were funded on its own 
from the market. Since all ESM costs are covered there is no direct transfer, but we have risk sharing of 
the programme country with the ESM shareholders. They ultimately suffer losses if a programme 
country were to default, but otherwise there are no transfers. Conditionality attached to such lending is 
designed to maximise the probability of full recovery. 
The ESM, or possibly a future European Monetary Fund (EMF), could make the first move for state 
contingent instruments without altering the degree of risk sharing it exercises today. It will introduce 
risk sharing with the markets, without increasing risk sharing among ESM member states. 
The EMF could test the waters and raise capital by issuing GDP-linked bonds, linked to euro-area GDP 
growth. By linking to a pooled GDP, the volatility of business cycles is reduced, thereby reducing the 
risk premium. The premium will still pass on to the programme country as part of the EMF borrowing 
rates, but now the programme country stands to benefit during recessions as we described earlier, and 
pays higher rates during an upswing. A potential problem is what to do if the programme country cycle 
is out of sync with the rest of the euro area. For instance, the start of Greece’s downturn was 
synchronised with the rest of the euro area at the start of the crisis, but it has been much prolonged 
and much deeper and has not kept up with the euro-area recovery. In such situations a formula can be 
worked out whereby the programme country pays according to its own GDP growth during a downturn 
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but pays above its own GDP growth during the upturn to make up for the losses. The sustainability 
principle will apply during the recession, and the actuarial fairness principle will be restored during 
upswings. Such an arrangement does not entail, in the long run, more risk sharing than ESM provides 
right now when it borrows with the collective security of its shared capital at lower rates and passes its 
costs to the programme countries. However, objections could be raised even for actuarial fairness in 
the long run as creditor countries might demand that actuarial fairness is always binding. In this 
eventuality, the programme country can be charged the average borrowing rate, which is the rate 
corresponding to the expected euro-area growth of the GDP-linked bond, plus costs.  
To summarise: 
It is possible to design EMF GDP-linked bonds to overcome coordination problems and kick-start a 
market, without additional risk sharing among euro-area countries. 
S-CoCos could be the instrument to implement maturity extension for countries entering an ESM 
programme8. If this extension policy is adopted, the ESM could request all countries covered by its 
mandate to issue S-CoCos, and this would promote these instruments in the euro area.  
There are potential problems with automatic extensions, such as the risk of ‘bear raids’, and market 
signals are not fool-proof. Hart and Zingales (2011) argue for the role of a regulator to mediate the 
automatic triggering of bank contingent debt. In the case of euro-area sovereigns, the EMF could play 
this role. If the threshold is breached, the ESM will carry out a debt sustainability analysis, as already 
prescribed in ESM Treaty Article 13 1.b. If the analysis determines that debt is sustainable, and the 
breach is not justified, the EMF would not activate the standstill and would commit some resources to 
prove its confidence in the sovereign. This would reassure the markets. The commitment should be 
unconditional and pari passu with existing financial debt to avoid EMF forbearance. The interest rate on 
the committed financing should be lower than the prevailing financing rates for the sovereign, but not 
much lower, so the sovereign has an incentive to correct any imbalances and benefit from re-
accessing the market at lower rates. 
If the analysis determines that the breach is justified, the standstill will be activated and the country 
will enter an adjustment programme with EMF seniority funding under strict conditionality. This staged 
approach is automatically triggered avoiding delays, which is one of the justifications for S-CoCos. It 
avoids bear raids since the EMF sustainability analysis and commitment to funding could reduce 
spreads and impose losses on the raiders. It is also consistent with the policy suggestions for risk 
sharing between ESM and the markets. Since the official sector does not need to pay-out existing bond 
holders, it can support a more gradual economic adjustment path. Finally, we do not preclude 
additional measures (eg a haircut) at the end of the grace period in the case of insolvency. However, 
because of the automatic standstill, more private creditors will be available and any haircut burden will 
be carried by more shoulders. 
  
                                                      
8 As discussed, for example, by former German Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble, and the German Council of 
Economic Experts (Andritzky et al, 2016). Buchheit et al (2013) also suggested modifications to the ESM treaty to make 
debt restructuring a pre-condition for assistance.  
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6 Conclusions 
Sovereign contingent debt is a financial innovation with the potential to strengthen the financial 
system. It is not without challenges, and, following the lead of G20, the debate to understand potential 
pitfalls is ongoing in international organisations and central banks. We have argued that sovereign 
contingent debt can provide insurance for euro-area countries against future debt crises. It loosens the 
bank-sovereign doom loop from the sovereign’s side, complementing existing and proposed policies 
for loosening the loop from the banks’ side. Current institutional arrangements – ESM or a future EMF – 
could benefit from the introduction of sovereign CoCos with a potential payment standstill or maturity 
extension, and could play a catalytic role in launching GDP-linked bonds. Simple simulations have 
shown that the potential for insurance protection is significant, but we have also discussed the major 
challenges that lie ahead.  
Our discussion adds the notion of risk-sharing with the markets to the Franco-German debate on risk-
sharing among states versus system-wide risk-reduction. This is a constructive way to move the 
debate forward, since risk-sharing with the market implies system-wide risk reduction. This is a 
financial innovation solution to the debate, and it is a practical euro-area reform that does not require 
major institutional reforms or Treaty changes. However, coordination is needed, as would be an 
amendment to the ESM (or possibly future EMF) mandate.  
Three conclusions are drawn from our analysis. 
First, the potential of these instruments will materialise only if they capture a significant share of the 
sovereign debt market. They do not have to replace all sovereign debt. Actually a diversity of 
instruments is key for broadening the investor base and building the resilience of the system. But 
sovereign contingent debt instruments cannot be relegated, as they have been so far, to a few 
boutique issues in the context of debt restructuring. 
Second, and following on from the above, is the need for coordination. This would overcome first-mover 
disadvantage, encourage the development of standardised products and pricing models, and create 
liquid markets with depth. Coordination does not imply risk sharing between countries. Every country 
pays premiums commensurate with its own risks and risk-sharing is only with the markets. The 
benefits for the euro area speak in favour of potential coordination, and institutional arrangements are 
in place to facilitate the process. 
Finally, a significant open question is the treatment of these instruments by the regulators. Will they 
be considered as eligible Tier I capital? To the extent that the designs guarantee capital at maturity, 
then they should receive the same regulatory treatment as standard sovereign debt. The premium 
received by a bank buying these instruments could provide guidance for incremental capital 
requirements. 
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